At the time of writing, the capsizing of the South Korean ferry Sewol in April 2014 may have filled many people with horror concerning the tragedy itself and the appalling loss of life, especially of young people, but the subsequent emergence of several accounts may suggest that this tragic accident is the result of a series of dubious and questionable practices which may have be plaguing the shipping industry for some time without any form of auditing or accountability, namely the incorrect loading of cargo or even overloading. These practices relate not so much to passenger safety but cargo safety, an area which has long been the focus of attention owing to a lack of control and a failure to provide adequate globally-recognised checks or balances in terms of cargo loading and stowage.

This article seeks not to apportion blame or even conduct a witch-hunt, but does seek to highlight the risks of a lack of marine cargo management, and at worst a failure to obey some basic international maritime regulations as laid down by international law. It highlights disasters which have resulted in erroneous cargo loading and stowage, and seeks to examine some of the issues behind the South Korean ferry disaster, as well as providing an insight in layman’s terms into how cargo should be loaded aboard vessel so as to maintain ship stability and trim.

Cargo stowage is a vital element to the subject of marine cargo management. Even in the days prior to containerisation, there was a need to ensure that goods were loaded in such a way as to correctly balance the vessel, so as to avoid the risk if the cargo shifting should the vessel encounter heavy or rough seas in stormy weather conditions. With the change to containerised transport in the 1960s, the need became evident to create a regime where containers could be loaded aboard vessel in such a way as to minimise the risk of imbalances which would lead to the vessel becoming too heavy at either the bow, the stern or amidships. In the case of incorrect loading, the following problems could arise:

FRONT-HEAVY

The bow of the vessel would sit lower in the water, and would ship more water as a result of waves crashing over the bows in rough seas.

TOO HEAVY AMIDSHIPS

The vessel could risk breaking its back in heavy seas.

STERN-HEAVY

There could be a great risk of instability from the point of amidships to the bows.

Further instability would occur if either side of the vessel were more heavilyloaded than the other, thus inducing a list to either port or starboard.

Further risks could also be imposed as a result of the failure to ensure that hazardous of dangerous cargoes were isolated from each other, especially in cases where two kinds of dangerous cargoes would react adversely if located adjacent to each other. Furthermore, risks to the safety of the vessel and its crew would be increased in cases where hazardous or dangerous cargoes were located close to the accommodation quarters on a cargo vessel, as in the case of the container vessel Hyundai Fortune in 2006. The essence of the issue of stowage, therefore, is to ensure that cargo is loaded aboard vessel in such a way as to avoid such risks and ensure that the vessel is correctly balanced prior to leaving port.

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) developed a Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing, and this Code was subsequently approved by the Maritime Safety Committee in May 1990, before being finally adopted by the Assembly in November 1991. There have been several amendments to the Code since its adoption, with the most recent being incorporated in the 2003 edition of the Code.

The Code has seven Chapters and thirteen Annexes, each dealing with various aspects of cargo stowage. These Chapters are arranged as follows:

Chapter 1 – General
Chapter 2 – Principles of Safe Stowage and Securing of Cargoes
Chapter 3 – Standardised Stowage and Securing Systems
Chapter 4 – Semi-Standardised Stowage and Securing
Chapter 5 – Non-Standardised Stowage and Securing
Chapter 6 – Actions which may be taken in heavy weather
Chapter 7 – Actions which may be taken once cargo has shifted 

Annex 1 – Safe stowage and securing of containers on deck of ships which are not specially designed and fitted for the purpose of carrying containers
Annex 2 – Safe stowage and securing of portable tanks
Annex 3 – Safe stowage and securing of portable receptacles
Annex 4 – Safe stowage and securing of wheel-based (rolling) cargoes
Annex 5 – Safe stowage and securing of heavy cargo items such as locomotives, transformers etc
Annex 6 – Safe stowage and securing of coiled sheet steel
Annex 7 – Safe stowage and securing of heavy metal products
Annex 8 – Safe stowage and securing of anchor chains
Annex 9 – Safe stowage and securing of metal scrap in bulk
Annex 10 – Safe stowage and securing of flexible intermediate bulk containers
Annex 11 – General guidelines for the under-deck stowage of logs
Annex 12 – Safe stowage and securing of unit loads
Annex 13 – Methods to assess the efficiency of securing arrangements for nonstandardised cargo

The above chapters and annexes account for all aspects of cargo stowage aboard every type of cargo vessel in existence, and also take into account every kind of cargo itself, other than bulk loads of either a wet or dry nature, as such loads are more evenly distributed throughout the vessel’s cargo holds by their very nature. There are specific chapters referring to the carriage of containers and also Ro-Ro vessels. These chapters are:

Chapter 2 – Containers
Chapter 4 – Ro-Ro vessels

Chapter 2 refers in particular to the specific means of cargo distribution throughout the container vessel, and places responsibility on the master of the vessel to ensure that great care is taken in planning and supervising the stowage and securing of all cargoes aboard vessel in order to prevent cargo sliding, tipping, racking or collapsing (Section 2.2.1).

Furthermore, the cargo must be distributed in such a way as to ensure that the stability of the ship throughout the entire voyage remains within acceptable limits so that the hazards of excessive accelerations are reduced as far as is practicable (Section 2.2.2). Cargo distribution should be such that the structural strength of the vessel is not adversely affected (Section 2.2.3). Section 2.9 states that where there is good reason to suspect that a container into which hazardous or dangerous goods have been packed or loaded is not in compliance with the provisions of the 1974 SOLAS regulations or the IMDG Code, the unit, i.e. the container, should not be accepted for shipment.

Chapter 4 deals with the carriage of certain specific cargoes such as road vehicles and road trailers, especially on Ro-Ro ships such as vehicle ferries. Securing points must be provided on such vessels for the purpose of securing trailers while the vessel is in motion, and road vehicles intended for transport by sea must be provided with arrangements for their safe stowage and securing. This arrangement includes road trailers carrying their own cargoes, and special consid-eration must be given to the height of the trailer and its centre of gravity. Furthermore, the master of the vessel has the right not to allow a road vehicle on board the vessel unless he is satisfied that the road vehicle is suitable for the intended voyage and that it is provided with at least the securing points specified in Section 5 of the Annex to Resolution A.581(14), which gives details of the lashing and securing points required on the vessel for the purposes of securing road vehicles and trailers.

In general, the master is made totally responsible for the safe stowage and securing of all cargoes aboard vessel, although in reality there is a load master at the port terminal whose role it is to supervise and control the loading of all cargoes aboard vessel on behalf of the vessel’s master. The loading schedule is arranged prior to the vessel’s arrival in port, according to the number of containers being loaded aboard vessel and their respective weights, and where they should be located with respect to other containers already loaded aboard vessel. The load plans are often arranged by the shipping agents, and these plans are conveyed to the port authority in readiness for when the vessel arrives and is to be loaded. Similarly, great care must be taken to ensure that the vessel’s load line (the “Plimsoll Line”, named in the 19th Century after its inventor, Samuel Plimsoll), is not exceeded. The Load Line gives various measures for the levels of acceptable loading according to the time of year (“Winter” and “Summer” Load Lines), as should the acceptable level of load be exceeded, the safety of the ship could be compromised and this would incur the risk of a heavy fine being imposed against the vessel’s master. To this extent, the Ship’s Cargo Officers must ensure that the vessel is not overloaded beyond the appropriate load line depending upon the time of year and the density of the water drawn by the vessel.

When loading certain cargoes, such as containers or bulk cargoes such as ore or oil, the vessel is liable to adopt a sagged position, especially where the heavier loads are located towards the bow and the stern, and where loading is uneven or unbalanced, or where the vessel sags amidships owing to a concentration of heavier loads at the centre of the vessel. Where the vessel is sagging, the apparent mean draught will be less than the actual mean draught, and such a situation does not permit overloading. Indeed, under such circumstances it is necessary to review the loading plan for the vessel and attempt to alleviate the problem by shifting some of the load to a more even pattern throughout the vessel, although in the case of bulk cargoes this arrangement may be more difficult to achieve. The aim of the exercise is to ensure an even loading throughout the ship in order to achieve complete stability while the vessel is in motion on the high seas. Many accidents to vessels have occurred through incorrect loading which led to an imbalance aboard the vessel and thus an inherent instability which led to the vessel listing significantly to either port of starboard when encountering a violent storm. In some cases, the imbalanced loading of the vessel with the heavier loads being located amidships have led to the vessel breaking her back and foundering under heavy sea conditions. In other cases, there was insufficient attention paid to the location of containers aboard vessel, which ultimately led to an inferno aboard the vessel caused by hazardous and dangerous cargoes being located too closely together on board vessel. There is also the rule that hazardous or dangerous goods should never be located below deck in limited spaces, where there is more risk of prejudice to the vessel’s safety and its integrity. The greater the length of the ship, the greater the propensity for severe forces being exerted on the vessel’s hull by the waves during choppy or rough sea conditions, especially when the vessel is heavily-laden. The increased deadweight in terms of the cargo exacerbates these forces, and thus can lead to a shortening of the vessel’s lifespan, resulting in premature heavy maintenance costs, especially during refits or dry-dock inspections, or even a premature departure for the breaker’s yard. Such has been the case for several container vessels, especially owing to accidents or damage sustained as a result of encountering stormy sea conditions, as in the case of the container vessel MSC Napoli in the English Channel in January 2007.

The case of the container vessel Hyundai Fortune reinforces the need to establish a regime requiring the master of a commercial vessel to be fully aware of all his cargoes, especially in the case of container vessels, and to be able to report this information in advance of entering national territorial waters. On 21st March 2006, a fire broke out aboard the 5,000 TEU container vessel Hyundai Fortune while sailing through the Gulf of Aden, on her way to the Suez Canal and the European Ports. Just after mid-day, an explosion ripped through the lower cargo area and hull of the vessel and aft of the accommodation area, sending between 60 and 90 containers falling into the ocean. The explosion caused a massive blaze which spread through the stern of the vessel, including the accommodation area in the vessel’s superstructure. As a result of the fire, secondary explosions occurred in seven containers above deck, which, it was discovered later, were full of fireworks. This fact was not known to the vessel’s master at the time of the disaster, but was only discovered later as a result of extensive investigations into the vessel’s cargo. It was also ascertained that as many as one third of the vessel’s complement of containers were damaged by the inferno. Every container aft of the accommodation area was either incinerated or lost at sea. It has been conjectured that the latter, larger explosions which crippled the vessel were caused by the detonation of the fireworks as a result of the heat resulting from the initial blaze. In this case, the requirements set out in the IMDG Code had clearly not been obeyed, and this breach could be used to bring severe liability to bear on the shipping line or its agents.

The main element of the issue concerns the knowledge of the cargo by the master of the vessel. It would appear that the containers holding the fireworks were all in close proximity to each other. Under the rules of stowage aboard vessel, any containers known to contain hazardous or dangerous cargoes must not be stowed together in a place close to the management of the ship or its accommodation area. They must be stowed well apart from each other, away from the areas of accommodation, and their presence must be known and understood by the vessel’s master, as in accordance with the SOLAS regulations it is the master who must ensure that all steps are taken to reduce the risk of spillage or destruction or the risk of threat to other cargoes or even the vessel itself, while the cargo is in transit. In the case of the need to report the vessel’s impending arrival at a port or even the vessel’s presence in limited waterways such as the Strait of Dover or the Storebaelt (Denmark), the risk of disaster is increased where the master of the vessel is not aware of certain cargoes aboard vessel, especially those of a hazardous or dangerous nature. If such a disaster had occurred in areas of water more limited than the Gulf of Aden, such as the Strait of Dover, the results would have been even more catastrophic, especially as there would have been no specific report issued to the U.K. or French maritime authorities concerning the hazardous nature of the cargoes aboard vessel. Previous incidents in the Strait of Dover have reflected similar circumstances, where a collision occurred between two vessels, and the resulting fire aboard one of the vessels resulted in the release of toxic vapours. One of the contributory factors of this fire was that certain containers of hazardous chemicals had been stowed in the forward area of one of the vessels, and these containers were damaged in the collision. The possibility of absence of knowledge of these cargoes by the master of one of the vessels may have contributed to a lack of information reported to HM Coastguards at Dover, coupled with a failure by one of the vessels to adhere to its correct separation lane.

Another case of cargo and container damage occurred on the night of 25th/26th February 2007, when the UK registered short-sea container feeder vessel Annabella was sailing across the Baltic Sea en route from the port of Antwerp to the port of Helsinki. She had loaded with containers in the port of Rotterdam between 21st and 23rd February 2007, before proceeding to the port of Antwerp for further loading of containers. From Antwerp, she proceeded up the North Sea coast and through into the Baltic Sea. During the night of 25th February, off the Swedish island of Gotland, she encountered heavy seas which resulted in severe rolling. In the early hours of 26th February, sea and weather conditions improved, and when checks were made on the vessel’s cargo, it was found that seven 30- foot containers stowed lower down in Bay 12 of Hold 3 had collapsed under the weight of the upper containers, several of which contained Butylene Gas, and were therefore classed under the IMDG Code as Hazardous Cargoes. It was discovered later that no account had been made on the stowage programme of the 30ft containers given their intermediate size, which was not accounted for in the port loading software. The result was an assumption that the 30ft containers would be capable of supporting the weight of the larger and heavier containers located above them, which was, in reality, not the case. This anomaly in the loading pattern meant that no account was made for the greater weight resting upon the smaller containers below deck, with the result that, during the period of heavy seas when the vessel was rolling and pitching in the Baltic Sea, the vessel’s violent movements caused an instability in the container lashings, and this, coupled with the disparities in container sizes, resulted in the lower containers collapsing under the weight of the upper containers. The software used for the stowage planning had not recognised the existence of 30ft containers, and when these details were changed to 40ft container dimensions, the computer was not alerted to the difference. Furthermore, there was no stability information available concerning the Annabella, and the containers were duly loaded without taking into account the differences in container sizes. The net result was an inherent instability concerning the differences between the container sizes on board vessel in Hold 3, with the result that the collapse of the containers occurred while the vessel was negotiating the heavy seas. The resulting investigation by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) highlighted the anomalies and errors in the system, in particular the failure of the computer software used to plan the loading and stowage of cargoes aboard the vessel to account for the differences in container sizes.

Another hazard to the correct loading and stowage of sea containers aboard vessel is the phenomenon known as “Parametric Roll”. On modern container ships, containers may be stacked several levels high above deck, although they are supposed to be securely lashed and secured. However, the design of container ships requires an aquadynamicallydesigned hull, especially beneath the waterline, to allow for increased operational service speeds. This streamlined hull beneath the waterline is combined with a full hull above the waterline designed to accommodate the maximum number of containers possible, along with the minimum practical space allowable for a superstructure. The end result is a vessel which, in calm weather, has no problem negotiating the average slight ocean waves, but, when encountering rough seas, is more susceptible to violent rolling from side to side owing to a higher centre of gravity caused by the disparity in hull construction.

This phenomenon is known as “Parametric Roll”, as it is an extreme form of lateral roll which is not encountered by other vessels. Indeed, so violent is the propensity to roll in heavy seas that on many occasions, several containers have been wrenched away from their secure fastenings and have fallen off the vessel into the ocean, with other containers remaining aboard vessel being badly damaged by the violent motion of the vessel. There are academic studies underway in various universities to understand the phenomenon and to attempt to reduce its prevalence, but as long as container vessel design requires aqua-dynamic streamlining below the waterline, the propensity for such an effect prevails. The problem is exacerbated by the numbers of levels of containers stacked above deck on any container vessel.

Were the vessel to simply hold containers below deck in the container holds, then the problem would probably not arise owing to the lowering of the centre of gravity on the vessel. But as the number of containers stacked above deck increases with the need to use as much space aboard vessel and above deck as possible, so the centre of gravity rises to a point where the vessel could risk becoming topheavy, or at very least losing its overall lateral stability. It is this effect which increases the risk of violent rolling in heavy seas, and thus increases the risk of the vessel capsizing or at very least shedding some of its precious cargoes. Heavy seas are almost a certainty at some times of the year, and thus there is a greater risk of this occurrence in such adverse sea conditions, especially in some parts of the world, such as the Bay of Biscay, where rough conditions are seen to be more prevalent than elsewhere. As long as containers are stacked several levels high on container vessels, the propensity towards the prevalence of parametric roll remains equally high.

A possible solution to the problem is to ensure that heavier container loads are placed within the hull section of the vessel, below deck, with lighter loads located above deck. In this way, the collective weight of the heavier container loads serves to lower the centre of gravity and lessen the effects of violent rolling in rough sea conditions. It serves to provide an efficient form of ballast, to maintain a better equilibrium on the vessel and so ensure that greater lateral stability is achieved. In turn, this lateral stability reduces the risk of parametric roll and so reduces the risks to the safety of the vessel when encountering adverse weather conditions. As long as the collective weight is evenly distributed throughout the length of the vessel’s container holds, the effects of such cargo distribution are less likely to damage the vessel’s integral construction and lead to structural damage or even at worst an ultimate structural failure of the vessel’s hull.

As well as the actual loading and stowage of the vessel, the documentation referring to specific cargoes should as a matter of course provide enough significant detail to determine the legality of the cargo or its legal weight. This is crucial in terms of the information concerning the cargo, as the ship’s Chief Officer, the member of the crew who is responsible for the loading of the vessel, must have sufficient information concerning the nature, size and weight of the cargo to be able to make an informed decision with regard to the safe loading and stowage of the cargo aboard vessel. Failure to obtain this information can result in the instability of the vessel once it is loaded, and, in the worst scenario, the capsizing of the vessel. For this reason, correct cargo documentation is crucial with regard to cargo safety, and some of the documentation is analysed as follows.

The CMR (Consigne de Marchandise Routière) Consignment Note is a transport document, but without the same legality as a Bill of Lading. In some ways, its function is similar to that of a Sea Waybill, except that it covers a road transport journey, usually with an element of sea transport integrated within the journey, namely a short sea Ro-Ro ferry crossing. The CMR Consignment Note is issued by the road haulage company for the consignment within a trailer load, and is transferred to the shipper through the freight forwarder, and includes any arrangements to ship the goods by Ro-Ro ferry where appropriate, especially where the consignment is travelling from the U.K. to a continental destination. The Consignment Note can cover not only the consignment itself, but also the entire trailer load where required.

In general, the maritime element of the journey is not specified on the Consignment Note, as in many ways the Ro-Ro ferry is only considered an extension of the roadway, but in reality a distinct booking must be made by the haulier with the ferry operator for the loading of the trailer on board the vessel, which is then seen as a maritime contract of carriage in its own right. However, there is a box on the CMR detailing any successive carriers, and the name of the ferry company could be inserted in this space on the Note.

Even if the shipper is not aware of the short sea Ro-Ro ferry route taken by the trailer, the haulier is aware of it, as not only is the responsibility of the ferry crossing on the shoulders of the haulage company, but also the cost of the journey must be taken into account by the haulage company and included in the freight invoice to the shipper, even where the ferry crossing is booked and paid for at the last minute, often by the driver of the vehicle himself. However, because of the nature of road haulage and the expediency of using the least-cost means of shipment, the haulage contractor may not decide until the last minute which ferry crossing the trailer is to take. Therefore, it is not always expedient to book a ferry crossing well in advance, as the choice of ferry service to be used may only be made while the trailer is on the move. This does not mean that the trailer is always accompanied by the driver. In many cases, the tractor is removed from the trailer prior to loading aboard vessel, and the trailer is moved onto the ferry by a separate tug, which leaves the trailer on board and drives off the ferry prior to its departure. The trailer is carried in an unaccompanied state to the port of destination, where it is driven off the vessel by another tug and is collected by a waiting driver in his own tractor unit ready for onward transport to its final destination. As long as the correct documentation refers to the trailer load, then the carriage may be undertaken without issue.

Ferry companies operate in stiff competition against each other, and it is the cost, expediency and convenience factors which will ultimately influence the trailer operator as to which ferry service will be used for a particular journey, which is why, in many cases, the details of the ferry company and the specific sea crossing may not be included in the Consignment Note when it is raised and issued to the shipper. It is often the case that on a journey from one country to another, the road haulage operator may only decide at the last minute which ferry service is to be used across the Channel or North Sea, as there may be little time to arrange the crossing once the trailer is on the move from its point of loading. For convenience purposes, many haulage companies elect to take the shortest crossing of the Englidh Channel, namely Dover-Calais, which lasts only 1.5 hours. Even considering the cost of road diesel fuel, many road transport operators based in the north prefer to drive south to the Channel Coast and use the shortest cross-channel route, rather than pay greater amounts of money to use the overnight sailings from the Tyne, Tees or Hull.

However, the 1956 CMR Convention requires the details of the ferry crossing to be included in the CMR Note, as this determines the identification of the ferry company involved in the marine part of the journey, and thus places the ultimate responsibilities for the marine part of the carriage of the consignment on the shoulders of the ferry company. There is still the duty of care on the part of the trailer operator to inform the ferry company of the nature of the consignments inside the trailer, for the purposes of maritime regulations as dictated by the laws of Carriage of Goods by Sea, so that a cargo manifest may be issued and presented to the master of the ferry prior to its departure. If the master is not satisfied with the contents of the cargo manifest, or more specifically the contents of a trailer in particular, he may elect to refuse to allow the trailer on board the vessel, although this occurrence is not common.

Only where a case of damage or loss occurs to a trailer or consignment while the trailer is on board a ferry will any account of the sea voyage be taken, as in the aftermath of the disaster befalling the ferry Herald of Free Enterprise off the Belgian Coast in the late 1980s, when the ferry capsized shortly after departure from the Port of Zeebrugge, and all the cargoes and trailers on board were lost. Under such circumstances, the CMR Consignment Note can be used by a ship-per to determine which ferry crossing was taken, so that action can be taken against the ferry company to secure compensation for any such loss or damage under the terms and appropriate Articles of the 1956 CMR Convention concerning the Carriage of Goods by Road, detailed in an earlier section of this text. It is thus important for the CMR Document to contain full details of the ferry crossing as part of the overall trailer movement, including the date of sailing, the ferry company used and the name of the vessel, as without such information, the sea carrier concerned could not necessarily be made liable for any damage caused to a consignment while aboard the vessel.

The cargo manifest is often overlooked as a freight document, in that it is not normally issued to either seller or buyer, but it nevertheless plays a vital role in the process of the movement of goods by sea. The cargo manifest is the first main document to be produced by the agent for all shipments being loaded aboard vessel. It is based on the load list submitted for the contents of every container, or even a list of all cargoes being loaded aboard a general cargo vessel, and details those cargoes to be loaded aboard the vessel. In the case of a container vessel, it details all the containers to be loaded aboard vessel and the contents of each container. It is from this information that the Bill of Lading can be derived, although on many occasions, the Export Cargo Shipping Instructions (ECSI) will perform the same function.

There are several copies of the Cargo Manifest, and these are kept by the following parties:-

The Vessel;
The Shipping Line;
The Shipping Agent at the port of departure;
The Shipping Agent at the port of arrival;
Export Customs;
Import Customs.

It is vital that a copy of the cargo manifest is kept on board the vessel, as this performs three distinct functions;-:-

It notifies the Master of the Vessel of all cargoes aboard vessel; It acts as the Master’s receipt for such cargoes; It acts as a legal function verifying that the Master of the vessel is fully aware of the cargoes he is carrying.  Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts, although the vessel’s Chief Officer is responsible for the loading and stowage of the vessel, the Master of the vessel is fully responsible as the carrier’s representative for all cargoes carried aboard vessel, and therefore must be fully aware of all the cargoes carried by that vessel, especially in the case of accidents or emergencies, should action be required to limit damage or problems which might endanger and prejudice the safety of the vessel and its crew. In this respect, the cargo manifest is also specified as an IMO FAL Document (FAL Form 2), one of the main maritime documents as specified by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). The FAL Form 2 is the IMO Cargo Declaration, and is nowadays transmitted and stored by electronic means, especially in its function as a Customs Cargo Report (CUSCAR). The electronic CUSCAR message can be used as:-

Arrival Declaration;
Departure Declaration.

It enables the Customs Authority to check the details of the vessel’s cargo in advance of the arrival of the vessel at port, and also enables the Customs authority to select containers and cargoes for examination, where deemed appropriate. However, the cargo manifest is not sent to the shipper, on the grounds that it is not seen as evidence of the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier. The documents sent to the shipper, i.e. the Bills of Lading, reflect solely the subject of the contract, i.e. the individual cargo which is the interest of the shipper.

Whereas the IMO FAL Form 2 is an overall cargo declaration (now covered by the CUSCAR regime) as well as being a summary of all cargoes carried aboard a vessel, the Marine (or Ocean) Bill of Lading is an individual declaration and a documentary description of a specific cargo consignment, usually in a container, and also represents a specific cargo detailed in the Cargo Manifest.

There is a clause at the bottom right of the Bill, stating that the Goods are “Received by the Carrier from Shipper in apparent good order and condition [unless otherwise noted herein]”, i.e. that the Carrier bears no responsibility for loss or damage to the consignment prior to receiving it at the appointed place. The Bill of Lading is issued following the departure of the vessel from the port of loading, thus proving, especially in the case of a Shipped On Board Bill of Lading, that the consignment was confirmed as having been loaded aboard vessel. This confirmation is supported by the evidence of an Export Declaration to Customs, followed by a series of electronic messages confirming not only loading of the consignment aboard vessel but also the clearance of the vessel by Customs and its subsequent departure. The Cargo Manifest in either its manual or electronic format, is produced by the Port Agents prior to the loading of the vessel. In the case of the US-led C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) initiative which was initiated in the wake of the 9/11 disaster of 2001, this is a legal requirement for all consignments to be exported to the United States since 2002, for the purposes of the presentation of the cargo manifest to US Customs Officials at the port of loading at least 24 hours prior to the vessel being loaded. Thus, for export purposes, a comprehensive reporting system exists, assuming that all consignments within a container are correctly detailed on a Bill of Lading, although anomalies pertaining to this accuracy of information are detailed in the following section. In the case of an FCL, this may be so, whereas in the case of an LCL Groupage Load, there is every possibility that only a generic description is given on the Master Bill of Lading, which will also refer to and be referred to by the FAL 2 Cargo Manifest.

A further issue concerning the information supplied on a Cargo Manifest concerns the mixture of non-EU and EU consignments carried on various vessels. The EU Authorities have decreed that the issuers of the cargo Manifest may voluntarily include details of EU-originating cargoes alongside details of non-EU cargoes on vessels which are moving between two or more EU Member States. Although this can include deep-sea container vessels, it is more likely to refer to short-sea container vessel services where the vessel may be part of a feeder service to link in with a deep-sea container service, or may simply be operating on a service between various EU ports independently of any feeder service. Such services also include Authorised Regular Operators, who operate Ro-Ro Ferries in areas such as the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Although the information they provide is more abbreviated and does not require the same detailed information as that supplied by deep sea operators or charter services on the grounds of the frequency and regularity of their sailings, there is still the need for a manifest covering all trailer and container loads aboard vessel for each sailing, as the vessel may carry both EUoriginating cargoes, or at least those cargoes deemed to be in EU Duty-Paid Free Circulation, as well as non-EU cargoes not in Free Circulation, i.e. those cargoes under Community transit status, on which Import Duty still has to be paid, or cargoes transiting the European Community territory en route for a non-EU destination. The EU-originating cargoes should be covered by a T2L Document. This document allows the consignments under this document EU treatment by the Customs authority when they are unloaded at the EU port of destination.

All of this leads to the tragic issue concerning the capsizing and sinking of the South Korean ferry Sewol on 16th April 2014, off the South Korean coast. The South Korean Government has faced huge criticism for the incident, which is currently under investigation as to whether the vessel took too sharp a turn before capsizing or was carrying more than the authorised amount of cargo to transport.

The 146m long South Korean passenger ferry Sewol capsized off the southwest coast on 16th April, as it sailed from Incheon, on the north-west coast of South Korea, to the southern island of Jeju. The Sewol was carrying 477 people at the time of the incident, including 338 students and teachers from the Danwon high school in Ansan, Seoul, who were on a field trip to Jeju Island. The ferry was also carrying 150 vehicles. There were at least 300 fatalities as a result of the capsizing of the ferry. It has been stated by the international media that the operator of the South Korean ferry was apparently being squeezed by competition from budget airlines and had to increasingly rely on its cargo business for revenue.

Investigators have not determined the exact cause of the accident, but the media has reported that the ship was overloaded with cargo and it may have been poorly stowed. It is known that the ship was carrying 476 passengers and crew and had a capacity for 956. The Korean Register of Shipping, which tested and certified the Sewol, stipulated that it should be loaded with no more than 1,070 tonnes of cargo and passengers combined. However, according to the international media, it has become evident that at the time of the disaster, the vessel was carrying 3 times her allowable cargo load. Prosecutors have said that determining the weight of the cargo is a key part of their investigation because of the suspicion of overloading.

Financial records of the operator, Chonghaejin Marine Co., show that cargo had become an increasingly important part of its income in the years since budget airlines started winning over large numbers of travellers. A professor in shipping management at Korea Maritime University stated that Chonghaejin faced an uphill battle against budget carriers, which led to a shrinking number of ferry passengers. However, in contrast, increased shipments of agriculture products from Jeju island to Seoul had led to increased cargo demand. The result was that passenger revenue at Chonghaejin dropped 31% last year from the 2008 level, when competition from budget carriers was low, while cargo revenue jumped 64% in the same period, according to company filings to the stock exchange. The filings showed that the cargo business is the company’s biggest earnings generator, accounting for 60% of Chonghaejin’s total revenue in 2013.

Chonghaejin started services on the route from Incheon, near Seoul, to Jeju in 2003. However, the number of passengers dropped for the first time in 2009, when budget airlines sharply increased the number of passengers they were carrying. The cheapest budget air fare is 40,500 Won ($39) for a one-way ticket to Jeju on a weekday. Passages on the ferry cost 71,000 Won ($68) and took 12 hours longer than the flight. The number of people going from Seoul to Jeju by air increased 72% from 2008 to 2013, to 12.2 million. The number going by ship dropped 7% to 118,717, according to port and airport data. The company reported a 785 million Won operating loss last year as it struggled against rising costs.

The Korea Shipping Association (KSA) and coastguard, which are responsible for checking that Korean-based ships are meeting cargo loading and stowing guidelines, were, at the time of writing, also being investigated, as the vessel was registered and classified in South Korea.

The moral to the tale, should there be one, is that more attention and due diligence needs to be paid to cargo safety and security, especially from the point of view of loading and stowage of cargo. It is questionable whether lessons have been learned from the days of Samuel Plimsoll. Indeed, one must wonder if Plimsoll’s body is rotating rapidly in its resting place as a result of the disasters detailed above. The Plimsoll line was invented for very good reason, and it is a legal and mandatory part of vessel registry. One of the modules of any merchant navy officer training and education programme is ship stability, and personal testimony can be made to its rigorous teaching. This module includes various elements of cargo stowage, and every Chief Officer will know, or should know, perfectly well the need to ensure absolute correctness when supervising the loading of cargoes aboard vessel, whether such cargoes are in trailers or containers, or are project or breakbulk cargoes. Personal experience in dealing with and advising major companies on issues of damaged cargoes, especially oilfield equipment and materials, tells me that it is far too easy to rely on shipping companies to arrange the shipment of cargoes, but it is far less easy to ensure the correct loading or stowage, as one has to rely on the combination of stevedoring facilities and the vessel’s crew at the port of loading to load and stow cargoes correctly, especially where such cargoes are hazardous or dangerous, or are susceptible to damage during the voyage if not properly loaded, stowed and secured. Indeed, the terms FOB and CIF were radically amended in the INCOTERMS 2010 changes to ensure that risk and responsibility for the shipment could only pass from seller to buyer once the cargoes had been correctly secured aboard vessel at the port of loading. More vigilance and due diligence is required on the part of both the shipper and the carrier in ensuring that cargo does not play any sort of part in the compromise of the safety of the vessel and its crew. It is the express duty and responsibility of the shipper to inform the carrier of the exact nature of the cargo, while it is the express duty and responsibility of the carrier to ensure that cargoes are correctly loaded and stowed aboard vessel under the Hague-Visby Rules. If such cargoes were damaged in transit, then under the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier becomes liable for such damage regardless of the ownership of the cargo at the time of transit. Cargo stowage and obedience of loading requirements is paramount in terms of vessel safety, and every shipping line would do well to recognise this, regardless of their financial position, reputation, or level of competence.